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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARCY G. MYERS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
V. 
DARLENE STOUT (COPPLE), 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 860279 
S APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff has appealed a judgment of the Third 
District Court quieting title to real property in the defendant-
respondent. The judgment is dated June 10, 1986, and was 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah on November 24, 1986, 
and by that court transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals 
which has jurisdiction under §78-2a-3(2)(h), U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the judgment is supported by the facts, 
husband and wifef owned the property jointly (Tr. Vol III pp. 6-7, 
14-15, 22; Exhibit 16-P). On April 26, 1976, they jointly executed 
a trust deed on the property to Tracy Collins Bank. The installment 
payments on the trust deed note were current at the time of trial 
(Tr. Vol. VII 10-13; Exhibits 24-D and 25-D). On July 21, 1978, 
Al Smith Const. Co. by Alvin R. Smith sold the property to defendant 
Stout under the terms of a uniform real estate contract (Tr. Vol. 
II pp. 3-4; Tr. Vol. VII p. 90; Tr. Vol. IX p. 5; Exhibits 1-D, 12-P! 
Payments of $25000, $500, and $5000 were made by defendant Stout 
to Alvin R. Smith (Tr. Vol II pp. 59-61). The payment for August 
1, 1978, and those made thereafter until April 20, 1979, were 
made to Alvin R. Smith (Tr. Vol. VII pp. 43-45). 
The check representing the April 20, 1979, payment was 
payable to Alvin and Sandra Smith and contained the notation 
"Mortgage payment to date for 4120 Donibristle Rd." The check 
was endorsed by both payees (Tr. Vol. VII pp. 41-43, 45; Exhibit 
4-D). At about this time, on April 18, 1979, defendant caused 
to be recorded a Notice of Interest (Exhibit 18-P) in which she 
declared her interest in the property to be "evidenced by a 
certain Uniform Real Estate Contract dated July 21, 1978, by and 
between Al Smith Construction Company as Seller, and the 
undersigned Darlene Stout as buyer." Defendant did not explain the 
tardiness of the recording of the notice of interest nor the apparent 
coincidence of the time of recording with the first inclusion as 
payee of Sandra Smith on the payment checks (Exhibit 4-D). 
The check representing the May 8, 1979, payment, was 
(3) 
issued in the same manner as the Apri]| 20, 1979, check, Sandra 
Smith endorsed the names of both payees to the May 8, 1979, check 
(Tr. Vol VII. p. 47; Exhibit 38-D). 
The check representing the June 5, 1979, payment was 
issued to "Sandra & Alvin Smith Const." with notation "Mortgage 
to Date on Above Address [4120 Donibristle Road, South Jordan, 
Utah 84065]," and again Sandra Smith provided the only endorsemen 
(Tr. Vol. VII. p. 46; Exhibit 37-D). 
The check representing the July 5, 1979, payment was 
issued to "Al and Sandra Smith," with notation "Mortgage to Date 
and Sandra Smith again provided the only endorsement (Tr. Vol. VI 
p. 47; Exhibit 39-D). 
The check representing the September 5, 1979, payment 
was payable to "Al & Sandra Smith" with notation "Contract to Dat 
House above [Jack or Darlene Stout 41^0 Donibristle Road, South 
Jordan, Utah 84065]," and Sandra Smith provided the only endorseir 
(Tr. Vol. VII. p. 48; Exhibit 41-D). 
The check representing the October 1, 1979, payment was 
payable to "Al & Sandra Smith," with notation "Paid to Contract t 
Date 4120 Donibristle," and was endorsed "Al & Sandra Smith" by 
Sandra Smith only (Tr. Vol. VII. pp. 47-48; Exhibit 40-D). 
The check representing the November 7, 1979, payment wa 
payable to "Al & Sandra Smith" with notation "Paid to Contract," 
and was endorsed by Sandra Smith "For Deposit Only Al & Sandra 
Smith." (Tr. Vol. VII. pp. 48-50; Exhibit 42-D). 
(4) 
The check representing the December 5, 1979, payment 
was payable to "Al & Sandra Smith," with notation "Contract to 
Datef" and was endorsed by Sandra Smith "Al & Sandra Smith." 
(Tr. Vol. VII. pp. 50-51; Exhibit 43-D). 
The check representing the January 1, 1980, payment 
payable to "Al & Sandra Smith," with notation "Contract to 
Date," was endorsed by Sandra Smith "Al and Sandra Smith By 
Sandra H. Smith." (Tr. Vol. VII. p. 49; Exhibit 44-D). 
In 1980 then defendant Stout commenced making payments 
directly to the bank (Tr. Vol VII. pp. 55-59; Exhibit 7-D). 
As to the inclusion of Sandra Smith's name on the payment 
checks, defendant Stout testified that she (Stout) was told by 
Sandra Smith to put her (Sandra's) name on the checks (Tr. Vol. 
VII. p. 67). The reasons given by Sandra, as testified to by 
defendant, were that "since [Sandra Smith] took care of the bank 
accounts and she [Sandra Smith] paid all the deposits to the banks, 
to put her name because she was part of the construction company 
and that she made all the deposits." (Tr. Vol. VII p. 67, Lines 
6-9); "Al was certainly not a businessman and if she didn't keep 
him straight he couldn't keep his head on straight, something to 
that effect, in a very joking manner;" (Tr. Vol. VII p. 67, Lines 
13-15); "'Darlene [Stout], make it [check] out to Al and Sandra 
Smith or Al and Sandra Smith Construction, because I'm the one that 
makes all the deposits.1" (Tr. Vol. VII p. 67. Lines 19-23). 
(5) 
nShe specifically told me to make the checks out to Al and 
Sandra." (Tr. Vol VII p. 68, Lines 24-25). In answer to 
plaintiff's counsel's question, "Isn't it true that you 
started putting Sandra Smith's name on the check because you 
had been told by someone that she hadn't signed the contract 
and you needed to do that to involve her?", defendant Stout 
answered, "No, Sandra Smith told me to put her name on the 
checks." And to plaintiff's counsel's next question, "So that 
she [Sandra Smith] could deposit them?", defendant Stout answered 
"So that she [Sandra Smith] could take care of her business. She 
said she had to run them through her books." (Tr. Vol. VII p. 
72, Line 25; p. 73, Lines 1-8). 
On December 31, 1980, Sandra Smith conveyed her interes 
in the property by warranty deed to Capital Recovery Corporation. 
The deed was dated and was recorded that day (Exhibit 19-P; Tr. 
Vol. Ill p. 18). 
At the time of the judgment (June 10, 1986) the present 
plaintiff was, and is, the record owner of the Sandra Smith 
interest (Tr. Vol. Ill p. 23; Tr. vol VII pp. 6-8, 10-11; Exhibil 
23-P). 
Before July 21, 1978 (the date of the contract), 
defendant Stout and Sandra Smith "talk[ed] about the purchase 
of the house." (Tr. Vol. II pp. 15-16). They further "discusse< 
the house and its sale after they talked (Tr. Vol. II p. 1 , . 
These talks and discussions between defendant Stout and Sandra 
(6) 
relating to the sale of the house, however, did not move 
defendant Stout to request Sandra Smith's joinder in executing 
the contract (Tr. Vol. II p. 20). 
As testified to by defendant Stout, on these occasions 
of talking and discussing, Sandra Smith statements were: 
"[T]hey had lived there and it was a lovely home 
and it was professionally decorated. She told me 
a great deal about the interior, about the decor 
about the rooms, and that it was too large for them. 
And since my [defendant Stout's] husband worked for 
Al as an agent, that she was delighted that — not 
only that, you know, we would move in there if we 
did, but that she would be living close by and we 
could run around together, which we did [Tr. Vol. 
II p. 16, Lines 17-25]. 
Again as told by defendant Stout, 
"Sandra Smith showed me through the house and pointed 
out various details about it, such as the fact that the 
sprinkler system had — had the automatic sprinklers. 
It had a vacuum, which she showed me how to use and 
she brought out the attachments, the fact that the 
decor was professionally decorated by her and the 
decorator and that there were certain pieces of furni-
ture that if I chose to purchase them from her, that I 
could. 
"The fact that she had the pool table and she said they 
were moving into a condominium and that they'd let the 
pool table go with the house because it would cost them 
too much to move it. 
"The fact that it had garage door openers and various 
other —." [Tr. Vol. VII pp. 28-29] 
"She [Sandra Smith] said that the purchase price at 
that time was ninety-seven five. She said that she 
had sold the house about six months prior but the deal 
fell through and she was desperate to sell it. 
"And I [defendant Stout] told her that my home was — 
that I was presently living in was for sale and that I 
liked her home and that in the event my home sold that 
I would be interested. 
(7) 
"And she [Sandra Smith] said — well, she says 
'We can work it out.1 She said that she had 
the dinette set that was specially ordered for 
the home and it would not fit into her condo-
minium." [Tr. Vol. VII p. 29] 
"She [Sandra Smith] told me she wanted to sell 
her home and she said that — she's the one that 
gave me the brochure on the home when it was in 
the 1976 parade of homes. [Tr. Vol. VII p. 30] 
"Q. [Nemelka] You stated that there was a home 
sales book that she gave you? 
A. [defendant Stout] Yes, she did. 
Q. Show you what's been marked for identification 
defense Exhibit 15 and ask you to identify that 
exhibit. 
A. Yes. This is the original book that she gave me. 
. . . . 
Q. Did you have a conversation with Sandra Smith 
at the first meeting you had with her concerning 
Exhibit 15-D? 
A. Yes, I did. 
. . . . 
Q. Now, you testified about the purchase price at 
that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You discussed that with Sandra Smith? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did she tell you about the purchase price? 
A. She told me that she wanted to sell the house, 
that was the price. 
Q. What was the price? 
A. Ninety-seven five was thd price. And she also stated 
that since she and her husband were in the construction 
business, that she moved periodically because they al-
ways moved in a home and then he sold it. She said she 
feld like a gypsy." [Tr. Vol. VII pp. 32-35] 
"Well, I remember we were in the kitchen and we discuss 
the dinette set and we discussed the —." [Tr. Vol. VI 
p. 40] 
"Yes. That's when the conversations were held [between 
the first one sometime ?n May, June 1978 r^i the date 
of this contract, on the 21st day of July 1978]. 
Q. [Nemelka] And did you have conversations at that 
time with Sandra Smith? j 
A. [defendant Stout] Yes. ± did every time. 
(8) 
Q. Was it about the purchase price of the property? 
A. Yes [Tr. VII pp. 40-41] 
Q. [Nemelka] I want you to tell the court what she 
told you about this Al Smith's Construction Company. 
A. [defendant Stout] She said that she was tired of being 
in the construction business because every time she 
moved in and decorated a home she knew that she was 
going to have to move out. 
She also told me that she had recently moved out 
of a home before moving into this one, a duplicate 
of my house, which is in Riverton right now, and Al 
Smith had — construction had built that home. She 
moved into that home thinking that she could stay 
there for a while but, she said, 'because our business 
is such we have to sell the homes because we make a 
nice profit on them.' And she says, 'and we have to 
sell the homes and move.' 
And she kept telling me: 'I feel like a gypsy. 
Every time I move in and get settled and have the home 
just the way I want it, then I know that we're going 
to sell it.' And she said, 'I'm very glad that you 
are buying it because your husband works with Jack 
and' — excuse — 'you're really going to love it.' 
She said this was one of her favorite homes. 
[Tr. Vol. VII pp.61-62] 
"Sandra told me that they had bought the condominium 
and they were making double payments; and that she says, 
'I wish Al wouldn't do this to me because I have all 
this bookwork to do all the time. 
"And at that point I went over to her house on numerous 
occasions and her office was in the basement and she had 
files — she had files there in her desk and usually I 
had to sit and wait before we went out to lunch because 
she had to finish up some bookwork [concerning Al Smith 
Construction]" [Tr. Vol. VII p. 63] 
"She [Sandra Smith] said that — that she had purchased 
the condominium and she wanted to move into the 
condominium because this house was way too large for 
her because her son had moved out or was not longer 
living at home. 
And she said she and her husband and her daughter lived 
there and it was much too large, and she was anxious to 
get moved into her next place. She said that — she 
used to tell me: 'The gypsy is on the run again,' that 
type of thing." [Tr. Vol. VII p. 72] 
(9) 
Sandra Smith's statements to defendant Stout, as told 
by Deanna Copple, defendant Stout's daughter, were, 
(Q. [Nemelka] And could you I tell the court what Sandra 
Smith said relating to the purchase or the sale of that home on 
Donibristle. . . . Was there any conversation about the sale of 
the home?) 
[Deanna Copple] Yes. I remertiber her [Sandra Smith] 
saying, "I 'was' real anxious because I loved the 
house." . . . Okay, yeah. She was real anxious to 
sell the home because she had already purchased the 
little condominium up the street. She mentioned to 
us that she wanted to get out of the yard work; she 
was sick of pulling weeds. . . . She went through 
details of — they had a lot of new gadgets, the 
vacuum cleaner. She told me that the sprinkler systems 
— that it leaked and where the pool table was, the 
window wells. 
(Q. [Nemelka] Did a purchase price ever come up durinc 
this conversation?) 
It was almost a hundred thousand, I remember, because 
it was — . . . yes, yes. I remember it was almost a 
hundred thousand. 
(Q. [Nemelka] And who mentioned the purchase price?) 
It was Sandra Smith. 
[Tr. Vol. VII pp. 77-78 
Q. [Nemelka] Now, did the subject of Al Smith Construd 
Company come up during any of those conversations? 
A. [Denna Copple] Yes. Sandra — 
Q. What did Sandra say about that company? 
A. It was always 'our company.' She always said, 'ours 
She — she told us that Al built the whole house; this 
was a duplicate of one in Riverton. 
Q. What did she say in relation to that house? 
A. She decorated it, she had a lot of input in the des 
of the house. I 
Q. Are there any conversations about her decorating an 
other homes? 
A. Yes. She — she — its was a hobby to her. She like-
to do it. As a matter of fact, she couldn't wait to ha 
us see her new condo and show how she redecorated that 
(10) 
whole place. 
Q. Was there any conversations by her during this period 
of time as to whether she decorated all the homes involved 
in Al Smith Construction Company, or most of them? 
A. Most of them, yea. 
Q. Tell the court what Sandra Smith said regarding her 
decorating any of these homes that were . . . being 
bought and sold. Q. Tell us what Sandra Smith said 
about decorating all these homes for the construction 
company. 
A. She said that she loved to do it. That was, she 
considered, her job. Al built homes. She decorated 
them. She — everything that she does put in the house, 
I remember her saying, was specifically designed for 
the house, such as, the bar stools matched the wood — 
I mean, just in detail. This woman loved to tell me 
or tell us how everthng was just made for the house. 
Q. Did you ever see her do any bookkeeping work in 
your presence? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Describe for the judge what you saw when you went 
into that — 
A. Okay. It was when I saw — it was after we were 
living in the Donibristle house. We went over. They 
invited us, I guess. Mom did make a payment to her, 
but she wanted to show me her daughter's new bedroom. 
So I walked in. Her daughter answered the door. We went 
downstairs to the office. Sandra was sitting at the desk 
doing bookwork. Darlene and Sandra started talking. 
Darlene had already had the check written out, just 
presented it for her, and then in turn they sent the 
two girls upstairs to look at the house. 
Q. Now, what did you observe there in that office around? 
A. Personally, it was a mess. We don't know if that 
has any bearing. 
Q. What business was she involved in? 
A. She had bookwork. She had a big book like a ledger 
she was writing in. I remember a huge book because I 
was over — 
Q. In any of these conversations that you had, how many 
did you totally have with Sandra Smith now? 
A. At least four. 
Q. In any of those conversations, did you ever hear 
Sandra Smith tell you that she was not selling her 
interest in the home? 
A. No. She was anxious. 
Q. Did you ever hear her say that? 
A. I heard her say she was anxious; this was a white 
elephant to her now because she had two house payments 
(11) 
and she couldn't make both of them. 
Q. My question to you was: Did you ever hear her say 
that she was not going to sell her interest in the 
home to your mother? 
A. No. 
[Tr. Vol. VII pp. 77-83] 
In 1980 Sandra Smith would not comply with the requests 
of defendant Stout to sign the contract (Tr. Vol. II pp. 17-21; 
Tr. Vol. VII pp. 59, 95-96). 
On January 21, 1982, Alvin R. Smith d/b/a Al Smith 
Construction Company, conveyed a one-half undivided interest in 
the property to defendant Stout by warranty deed which deed 
defendant Stout had recorded on September 9, 1983 (Tr. Vol. II 
pp. 55-56; Exhibit 11-D) while this action was pending and she 
was represented by her present counsel. 
In the lower court defendant Stout filed her answer 
in which she denied the material allegations of the complaint 
(R 17-19). The answer, in conclusory form, contained three 
affirmative defenses. On March 29, 1985, without first having 
obtained leave of court, defendant filed her amended answer in 
which she alleges again in conclusory form, a number of affirma-
tive defenses (R 180-184). On December 23, 1985, the lower court 
directed that a non-jury trial be scheduled. (Tr. Vol. VI p. 19) 
Plaintiff was not afforded and was denied the opportunity to 
demand a jury trial on those issues raised by defendant Stout in 
her amended answer properly triable oi right to a jury. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The judgment is not supported by the facts. 
(12) 
ARGUMENT 
Hereaftrer, reference to the "property" shall mean 
the one-half undivided interest in the real property described 
in these proceedings of Sandra Smith and her successors in 
interest. 
THE JUDGMENT IS WITHOUT ADJUDICATORY EFFECT: 
The basis for the quiet title judgment as to the property does not 
appear. There is no indication how or when defendant Stout 
acquired an ownership interest in the property sufficient to 
warrant a decree quieting title to the property in her. State, 
Etc. v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335 (Utah 1979). A judgment is a link 
in the chain of title only where it transfers title or renders 
valid a particular link in the chain of title which without the 
judgment would be defective or invalid. Defendant Stout's present 
title to the property is based wholly on the judgment of the lower 
court. Nowhere is any independent title exhibited, nor any right 
nor interest which the judgment connected to title. In Minnesota 
Debenture Co. v. Johnson, 94 Minn. 150, 102 NW 381 (1905), the 
court stated: 
"It would be a departure from settled rules to hold 
that an ordinary judgment in an action to determine 
adverse claims to land, obtained by a total stranger 
to the title . . . operates to transfer title, or 
constitutes a link in the chain of title, and . . . 
admissible in evidence as such against the true 
owner . . . " 
(13) 
(At page 8, beginning at line 1, Vol. Ill/ Transcript, defendant 
Stout's attorney is reported as saying 
,fShe [Sandra Smith] was actually part of the 
contract and orally participated in it, was a 
part of all of it; and that her oral contract 
was made as of this written agreement [referring 
to the uniform real estate contract, Exhibits 1-D 
and 12-P]."; 
what follows reflects plaintiff's pe^eptions of what appear 
to be defendant Stout's attorney's contentions in this matter 
as taken from his quoted statement.) 
MERGER: Delivery and acceptance of the deed of January 
21, 1982, which deed defendant Stout had recorded on September 9, 
1983 (Tr. Vol II pp. 55-56; Exhibit 11-D), the provisions of the 
uniform contract (Exhibits 1-D and 12-P) are deemed extinguished 
and superseded by the deed. Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 
1986) 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: If[ as it appears, defendant 
Stout is attempting to establish an oral contract and part 
performance, she must bring her action to do so within the time 
limited by §78-12-25, U.C.A., 1953 (four years). There is no 
clear indication how and when the oral contract referred to came 
into being but there was no attempt to assert its existence until 
defendant Stout's amended answer on March 29, 1985 (R 180-84). 
The only verbal communications relative to the sale of the propei 
between defendant Stout and Sandra Smith took place according to 
defendant Stout and her daughter, Deanna Copple, before July 21, 
1978 (Tr. Vol. Ill pp. 15-16; Tr. Vol. VII pp. 40-41). If the 
(14) 
claimed oral contract is separate from the uniform real estate 
contract then it is time barred. The limitations defense was 
raised by plaintiff in RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM (R 
374-377) dated April 2, 1986, p. 4 (R 377). If the addition 
of Sandra Smith's name or signature to the uniform contract is 
the oral contract the parol evidence rule would preclude such 
proof, McDonald v. Barton Bros. Inv. Corp., 631 P.2d 851 (Utah 
1981), as well as being time barred. 
PART PERFORMANCE: Defendant Stout's claim of part 
performance is based upon the addition of Sandra Smith's name 
as payee on certain checks issued for installment payments 
under the uniform contract (Exhibits 4-D, 37-D through 44-D), 
and Sandra Smith endorsing such checks for deposit to a bank 
account in the joint names of Alvin R. Smith and Sandra Smith, 
or to Tracy Collins Bank for the "mortgage" payment. 
Making the payments on the uniform real estate contract 
cannot be considered part performance of any claimed oral contract; 
McDonald, supra. The acts of part performance must be exclusively 
referable to the oral contract. Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 
534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975). Besides, the payments were not made 
in pursuance of an oral contract but were made in such manner at 
Sandra Smith's request, according to defendant Stout's own account, 
(Tr. Vol. VII pp. 67-68, 72), "since [Sandra Smith] paid all the 
deposits to the banks, to put her name because she was part of 
the construction company and that she made all the deposits.", 
(15) 
and were not so made to involve Sandra Smith in the uniform real 
estate contract (Tr. Vol. VII pp. 72-73). 
The record is devoid of any bral contract or agreement 
by Sandra Smith to sell the property to defendant Stout. The 
terms of such a contract must be clear, definite, mutually under-
stood, and established by clear, unequivocal and definite 
testimony, or other evidence of the same quality. Holmgren, 
supra; Christensen v. Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 339 P.2d 101 
(1959). 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS: One joint tenant without the 
approval of the other can transfer away his or her share of 
the property, leaving the remaining joint tenant a tenant in 
common with the grantee. Nelson v. Davis, 592 P.2d 594 (Utah 
1979); Tracy Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, 5 Ut2d 350, 301 P.2d 
1086 (1956). 
Where one cotenant undertakes to convey the whole title 
to a specific piece of property, the conveyance is not void but 
only operates to transfer that individual's interest in the land. 
Texas American Bank/Levelland v. Morgan, 733 P.2d 864 (N.M. 1978) 
Handy v. Shiells, 235 Cal.Rptr. 543 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1987). One 
joint tenant or tenant in common cannot bind his cotenant by a 
contract which he may make relating to the common property. 
Carbine v. Meyer, 126 Cal,?d 386, 272 P.2d 849 (1954). There is 
no husband-wife exception to the statute of frauds. Williams v 
Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986). Only a written power of 
(16) 
attorney will authorize one to bind another to a contract for the 
sale of real property. Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983). 
"Ratification" and "acquiescence" are mentioned in 
these proceedings as theories of defense. If the evidence tends 
to show acquiescence by Sandra Smith in the uniform contract such 
acquiescence was terminated when she refused defendant Stout's 
request to sign the contract (Tr. Vol. II pp. 17-21; Tr. Vol. 
VII pp. 59, 95-96), and her grant of the property to Capital 
Recovery Corporation (Tr. Vol. Ill p. 18; Exhibit 19-P) "amounted 
to a tacit repudiation of any conflicting oral agreement on her 
part." Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Ut2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970). 
And here, as in Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982), there 
was no ratification as a mater of law "because the Utah statute 
of frauds requires that any agent executing an agreement conveying 
an interest in land on behalf of his principal must be authorized 
in writing. . . . [and] [w]here the law requires the authority 
to be given in writing, the ratification must also generally be in 
writing." 
The present plaintiff may defend defendant Stout's claims 
on the basis of the statute of frauds. "'Successors in title to 
one who has made a contract unenforceable as against himself by 
reason of the statute [of frauds] can take advantage of the statute 
[of frauds] in the same way that the contractor hirrself could 
have done. . . . Thus, if a vendor makes an oral contract to convey 
to A, and then later conveys the land to B, the conveyance to B is 
fully operative as against A.'" Family Finance Fund v. Abraham, 
(17) 
657 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1982). 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment is not supported by the evidence and the 
facts and should be reversed and the cause remanded to the lower 
court with instructions to proceed to partition under the statute 
•^/C 
ROYAL K. HUNT 
PROOF OF MAILING 
On August 19, 1987, I mailed four copies of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to Carl J. Nemelka, attorney for 
defendant Darlene Stout (Copple), at 75 North Center, American 
Forkf Utah 84003, postage for first-class mail fully prepaid 
thereon. 
in ROYAL K. HUNT 
(18) 
ADDENDUM 
(Page) 
Statute of Limitation, §78-12-25, U.CJA., 1953 A 
Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 1-D) B 
Warranty Deed (Exhibit 11-D) * C 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT (R 464-466) * D 
§78-12-25. Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(1) an action upon a contract, obligation or liability 
not founded upon an instrument in writing; * * * 
ADDENDUM A 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
"This is a legally binding form, if not understood, scelc competent advice." 
1. THIS AGREFMKNT, made in duplicate this 2 l c t day of slul^L , A. D., 19-7-8. , 
by ai.d betueen _ Al„Smith _Const,. Cp^..
 ( 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and l&rlcne_Stout 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of U c s t - J o r d o n , Utah-
2.. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mention* <1 ngrte:i to «?ell and com jy to th«» hu:.»'r, 
and the buv*r lor tne considviatiuit herein rnt-ntioncd agrees to purcharo tlw fellowm" d«^ crih<vl n al property, situ ite m 
the county of S a l t Lake , State of Utah, to-wit: JhlZO. w» S o p J J b r i s t l s _ J d L 
ADDHLS9 
More particularly described as follows: S o . J o n l o n , Utah $ K ) 6 5 
Lot 23 Clciunoor Village, according to the official plat thereof 
recorded in the offices of Gait Lake County 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of 
^'intxjaflyeiL.tliou^and fiva hunrirctLAjO/lOO - ~ _ ±~ Uuiiars ($.97^500^00--) 
po>ablc at the office of Seller, his assigns or order .A& -d-UfQClodJzy O C i l c r . — .. —. 
s'.rir.iy within the following times, to-wit: 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $—2Z+.QQCL.QQ shall be paid as follows: 
An additional $5,000.00 down payment to be paid within 90 days from 
this date. $>3?.93 or more each month principal and interest plus 
1/12 of the General property taxes and 1/12 of the annual fire insurance 
premium each month payable commencing on Aucust 1, 1973 and on the 
z (1st) day of each month until the unpaid principal and interest if; 
paid in full. The estimated taxes and insurance costs for the remainder 
of 1973 are $200.00 per month jnakfcng the payment $788.00 per month. The 
buyer will refinance the hone within 5 years of this date and pay the 
Possession of said premises sifall"Le ift'Iivcred to buyer onlne"*-! lS.t '.— day of —J.uXy , I J... 73 . 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the ndu-tion of the 
principal. Interest shall bo chained from , *H*ly *» 1 9 / P , — on all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of t e n per cent ( 1 0 Tr) r«»r annum. The Buyer, at his option jt anytime, 
:,my pa; amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or co-iuact h*. the Bu\cr herein assumed, such excens to be applied either to unpaid prinrip U or in prepayment of future 
installments at th« election of the buyer, which election must be made at the lime the excess payment is made. 
3. It is un.U-r-tood and agreed th.it if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on '-his conliact less than according 
to th? t'rms here:n mentioned, then by 30 doin»», it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property Jn favor of —jD^Qy— 
** "ort*;a . \e C o , ~Tvith an unpaid balance of 
$-67^00^00 as of _Jj j ] jLlQ,JL978 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district ta\e.< covering improvements to said prem-
ises now- in the pioc«;ss of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid (or, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following _Nq_OXCqp_tlpn3 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate ot not to exceed Ten 
percent 
(__ 10 <T«-) per annum and pt\ab!o in regular monthly installments; provided that the aggregate monthly installment 
pigments required to be mnde by Seller on said loaii3 shall not be greater than each installment pa>ment requiied to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loan* and mortgage the Seller ngicea to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described pioperty 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Bu\er desires to exercise his right through accelerat-d payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Iltiyot'd obligation to a»*ume and 
pay any penalty whkh may b« rnpmcd on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said picpeity incurred by Heller, after date of this agivemeut, thall be paid by seller unless 
said obligations are assumed or approved by bu>cr. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to mahe application to a reliable lender fur a loan of vich 
amount J3 can be icvUied ui.der the regulations of raid lender and hereby arrcv* t« apply any amount no received up«>n 
the purchase price abo\e mentioned, and to execute the papers required and p.iy one-half the expenses necessary in ob-
tai-M i^* sanl loan, tho Seller agreeing to pay tlie other one-half, provided however, th.it the monthl) payments and 
interest ra»e required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest tale a3 outlined ahovo. 
11. The Buyer agree-* to puv all taxc3 and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be asse*««d 
and which may become due on these premiss during the life of thii agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
No Qxcejtlona 
ADDENDUM B 
The Seller further covenant* and agrees that ho will not default in the y ivment of his obligations against said properly. 
12. The J5u\er agrees to pay the general i:.xcs after J . u l y . _ l » 197& _ . ; 
13. The Buyer further ar.rccs to keep ul\ insurable huiWitKs and improvement* on said p r e m i e s insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid halar.ee on tins c o n t r a c t o r S **"T!—7_ 
and to assign <au! iiisurai.ee '.o the Seller a? hi., interests may appear and lo delivu the insuiunce policy t«-» himT 
14. In the event l!ie Hincr -mall default in tat payment ot an> special or rent in! taxes, a -.;< ss imnt* or insurance 
premium* as he:ein provided, the Seller may. at his option, pay raid taxes, assessments aial in^uianco premiums or either 
of tin m, and tf Seller c!«»;*H so to do. 'hen f he Hover ai:iee> to repay the- SeUei upon demand, all j.wl» sum? v . advanced 
and paid »»y htm, ;ogeth*v with in terer tht t .un front date of payment of : aid sum; at the rate of •); of one p e u c n t per 
month until paid. 
1". Buyer asricvs that he will not commit or >t;ffer to IK- reitimitted any vaatc. -puil, or destruction i:-
 u r upon 
iaid premised, and that he udl maintain said p ie i . i . oa \n good condition. 
10. In the w e n t o( a failure to comply with the term.* hereof hy the L'uycr, or «f failure of th* Buy*; to make 
me shall b*coir>c due. or within _ T h i r t y _L3QjL days theicafter. the any payment or payments, when the 
Sv'tler, al hi» opt .on .-.Lull h a w Use fd lou i i e ; a l t e r n a t e s remedies: 
A. Seller s ta l l have the liitbt. upon faduie of the Buyer to ivmedv tin -default wilhm f i w ilaya after written notice, 
to be K'!«-iM';l truiu all obligations in law and in equity to convey .said propeitv, and all pavnants vii it i i have 
been m:i.l.» theieJi.foiv on this eoiitia-t hy the Buyer, fhall he fo i fe iud lo the Seller as li'iualatcl d.imne. .-» for 
the i on I»>M i-'ioiance of Uie contiact. and the Buyer ngioet that 11 •• - Siller loay at hi.; option re-et.l* t ai'il'tal.e 
po.^w .io: of s.nd pi-eo'i.-:i> without ht;al proee^e i :i> in it; I ii -t an.I former « J.i.'e, tor.'-thci- vitl: aj/ HO/M-MC'-
n«ent; a id additions made hy \\w Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvement-.; shall u-miin v\ith 
the la id and become the property of the Seller, tin l'.uyer becoming at once a ten tnt at will of the i \). »•; or 
B. The SvlLi may hiing suit and rceover judgement for all delinquent installments, including c .u and att' .jnrys 
fees. iThe use of this lemedy on one or imuv occasions shall not pre. , tit the Seller, at his option, from u .sorting 
to one of the other lemedies hereunder in the event of a . . a b l u e n t default): or 
C. The Seller >hall have the l ight , at his option, and upon wtitUu notice to live Buyer, to declaie th" ci-.ttr*- unpaid 
balance hereunder at once IIUQ and payable, and may eleet to t ieat this contract "a- a note and mart it:«\ and p:»s«; 
title to the Ihncr sul>jec» thereto, and proceed immediately to fo»e.do.;e the *ame in ac<«rdarice with'iio- 1-iv.s <>.' 
the Slate of I'tah, ivA have the property sold and the pioceed:; applied to the pa\ n.^nt of toe balaiu-e o.vin;:, 
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may ha\e a judgement for any ihfoie i icy whiih »»:;»•. lunai i i . 
In the cr..-e of l'uici'lo.uirv, the Seller heieundei, upon the filinj: of a complaint, .-.'lu.ll he iirmodiatel:. entit'.el to 
the app.jrr.ment of a i v iv i \ er to t ik» p>.»sse^sion of said tuotti'.ae' d prop»it> a i • • I collei» the icnt-i, »-:.»H*A ar.l 
profits l . e u U o i n and a\«ply the >ame to the pa\n.cnt of the otdivation he i emuki , or hold the s i m c |>u<suant 
to utuK-r of the couit; and the Seller, upon entry of janirinent of futede-burc, shall he entitled to the }ios.>csbion 
of the said premi.su.> diuim; the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time ii the essence of this agreement. 
IS. In tl.t cv .n t there arc any liens or «ncumhrauces a/ninst :a'ol premise.? otlur lh:.?« tho .e h.-uin provided for or 
re f enrd to, or in the event any hens or eneu-nhrauces other than fieiein provid-.-d for shall hereafter accrue a;;air.it the 
sar •» by acts or nculcct of the Seller, then the H»«yer ma>, at his option, pay a:ul distharue the same and rreeivc credit 
on th^ amount then temaining due hereunder in the amount of any >uch payment or payments and theieaft tr the pay. 
r-.cn?" herein pr».el led to be made, may. nt thr option of the l'.ayer, bo suspended until such a time as such suspended 
p»yir.*;nt* shall cq.ial any ^ums advanced a> al'ou-said. 
19. The Seller on receivinp the payment-- herein reserve! U> be paid at the time and in iUo mnnner above nien*i>"»ned 
n^rees to execu'c and deliver to the Buyer or a>-icn$, a j/ood and suf'Jrient warranty deed conveying th^ title to the 
above described premises free and char of r.ll cm •umbra nee.-* except a.i hen in mention'.} and except n:< may have a*v»uod 
by or through the acts or nc:'l>'('t of the Bu>er. and to furni>h at his expanse, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of \b» purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an a t t r a c t brought to date at tune of rale or at any time da i ing the 
teirr. of this agreement, or nt time of delivery of deed, at the up*ion of l'.uyer. 
20. It i« hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said pr.perty 
in its present condition and that there arc no representation*, eovenauU, or agreements bet.veen the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except 33 herein specifically set forth or attached hereto - H Q I I G 
21. The Hu\cr and Seller each agree that .-hould they default in any of the covenants nr agreements contained her* 
in, that the defaulting parly -diall pay alt costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pui.;uing any 
rtni*-Jy orovided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understoed that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrator*, suc-
cessors, and assigns of the re*pccti\e parties hereto. 
IN WITNKSS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their name*, the day and year 
f i m above written. 
Signed in the presence of 
_ {feller 
Buyer 
5* 
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WHEN BBOOftDBD, MAIL TO: 
Pariana Stout 
3683 South 2200 Weat, Unit #67 
Weat Valley City, Utah 84119 
# Kin < 
Above T-tt UN J 
3S41(Ji(j WARRANTY DEE P 
^ 3 5 
Alvin R. Smith dba Al Smith Conatruetion Company 
of S a l t Lake City , County of S a l t Lake 
hereby CONVEY a and WARRANT a to DARLENE STOUT 
Sown* 75rts*r '• fW+jT 
of Weat v a l l e y c i t y , County of S a l t Lake 
, State of Utah, 
.grantee 
, State of Utah 
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDER^££^fij, 
the following described Met of tad la SALT LAKE cwr, •tete of Utah, fcMrtli 
LOT 23» GLINMOOR COUNTRY ESTATES #1, FrJMP HK% CITY OF SOUTH 
JORDAN, COUNTY or SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, my undivided one-half 
interest therein and thereto. 
WITNESS the hand of satd graaw
 # this 21at day of J^ne ,18 *** 
Signed in the pre* snee of 
Alvin R. Smith dba Al Smith 
Construction Company 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County r( i;alt Lake } -
'to the 21at d^'ei June - \ ;,%.. ,1882 
pereooeily appeared before c e Alvin R. Smith dba Al S n i i t ^ o f c e t ^ j u c t i p n ^ 
Company ** !•; ^-r^~ 
the signer of the shore inataunent, who (injy yknowleaged teiac-that ^T ezacotee* t&a 
v i t r ^ , V r f d 5 m , . ; •A>,Jr>.V% • T:i^. >.' 
My fommissUMi expires 1:20-84 Residfaf la «*** fof g t y t s ' •• 
"^TT" 
Af PR0VRD FORM — UTAH SBCURTria* OOMMMKOji 
POftM let - WASJIANTV DOT* - OUVM^M 
ADDENDUM C 
.>..''nity ot b a l i LrtRC 7 C 
i the U'.u'/'rsi^H' 
UUih. do hiMShy U 
of ti saa1 iii..i <»i; (V 
wntingb re^-.'i'O'J . 
and that i!u; *»r <•< * 
< . p / Ol UC, (T, ;,<;.:' 
. f:; 
Witness m/ h i v l ; J vr,i of ii^o f ^ u ^ r th„ 
r*ii- .",? ' __. - ^ 19 . 
KA7 it t 0 ! ^ , B-frscr^i/ 
f>eM.;v 
/ 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt LaKe City, Utah 
CARL J . NEMELKA - Utah. 3 a r No^.,2395. , 
JUNE LUBNIEWSKI WILSOIl r p t ah *^rr t to 
At to rneys for DefendattttlStifcwiy* C L / 
610 East South Temple, Suite 2U2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)521-5552 
4367 
H Dixon Hiijdley, 
By 
J UN 1 0 1986 
n  rk 3|d Oist Cou 
Deputy Clork 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH " 
— o o o O o o o — fij £ # 7 jyp . £ * $ 
MARCY G. MYERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DARLENE STOUT, et al., 
Defendants. 
6 "M-/C -
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
2>;J o 
a^ 
Civil No. C 82-5014 
Judge Fishier 
oooOooo--^-
Defendant's Motion to Introduce Exhibit, for Additional 
Findings of Fact and for Judgment and plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment and Motion to Re-open Proceedings to Receive Evidence 
were heard by the Honorable Philip Fishier on Monday, Mav 
5, 1986. Upon agreement of counsel, and being fullv apprised 
of the matter the court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the following Order and Judgment, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1) A certified copy of a Quitclaim Decree dated May 
24, 1982, recorded June 7, 1982 at Page 1046 of Book 5380 
in the Salt Lake County Recorders Office in which Larsen & 
Sons, Inc. is grantor and Jody Larsen is grantee be, and 
hereby is admitted into evidence; 
2) A certified en of the corporate documents of 
ADDENDUM D 
Larsen & Sons, Inc. on file with the State of Utah Division 
of Corporations be and hereby is, admitted into evidence; 
3) The court does hereby take judicial notice of the 
Pleadings and Discovery on file herein; and 
4) Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment be and hereby is 
denied and that defendant's Motion for Judgment be and/ 
hereby is granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
defendant Darlene Stout Conple is the sole and exclusive 
owner in fee of the real property more particularly described 
as: 
Lot 23, Glenmoor Country Estates #1, Plat K, 
according to the official plat thereof on file 
in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
and title to the above-described real property is hereby 
quieted in Darlene Stout Copple. The Salt Lake County 
Recorder's office is ordered that the records therein shall 
reflect Darlene Stout Copplefs title thereto. 
DATED this #lday QfQ^c^- 1986 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to Form: 
ROYAL K. HUNT 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
PHILIP msntu
 ATTCQT 
DistrictA Judge . JJlLKini P> 
V H DIXON HINDLEi 
M
 CLERK 
fcputyXSieri 
LKA 
or Defendant 
-2-
